Este trabajo constituye un intento de confrontar el marco conceptual propuesto por la economía de la regulación con la evidencia empírica provista por la estructura arancelaria Argentina. Con ese fin analizaremos la plausibilidad que variables propuestas por la economía de la regulación sean de utilidad a los fines de explicar dicha estructura arancelaria.

Introduction

This paper examines a neglected economic phenomenon - the impact of inflation on the structure and inequality of wages. There is little evidence for the nonneutrality of inflation on income and earnings of individuals; however, the goal of lowering inflation rates seems to be the most important one in countries that experience even a moderate level of inflation. This goal, moreover, seems to be associated with a goal to improve income distribution².

"Besides number and intensity, there is a technique of group activities which must be taken into account. Blows, bribes, allurements of one kind and another, and arguments also, are characteristic, and to these must be added organization. A group will differentiate under fitting circumstances a special set of activities for carrying on its work. We must learn how these specialized activities vary under different forms of group opposition, how the technique changes and evolve.

This paper postulates the hypothesis that the stability of the rules under which different interest groups compete is a relevant consideration for explaining economic growth. Under this hypothesis, it is possible to propose indices that may capture the degree of stability of the rules of the redistributive game better than the usual measures of political stability.